Сомалийский сценарий что это

Юрий Городненко

При этом патриоты прекрасно понимают, что детское сознание только формируется. Разорвать его, разрушить душу подростка легко, а нравственные травмы нанесенные детям остаются на всю жизнь.

Именно поэтому стаями устремились «патриоты» в школы.

Так, Антон Геращенко (занимая должность советника министра внутренних дел Украины) на телеканале БТБ призвал готовить школьников к войне уже с 12-13 летнего возраста.

Другой «патриот», Владимир Головчак (сельский глава села Новица Калушского района Ивано-Франковской области) создал из малышей и подростков 2-10 лет батальон «Сокол». Собирается помогать воевать «с русскими».

Несовершеннолетних Мариуполя вместо уроков направляют рыть окопы. Школьные «уроки памяти» в годовщину Голодомора превращают в орроуэловские «пятиминутки ненависти», в ходе которых смакуют факты каннибализма.

Но даже это меркнет на фоне акции, проведенной педагогами и представителями ранее никому не известного общества «Родинна спільнота» в Первой национальной гимназии им.Н.Аркаса Николаева. Здесь взрослые «партиоты» во главе с директором гимназии Сергеем Бережным организовали распродажу «кулинарных шедевров».

Все это действо назвали (с молчаливого согласия городского отдела образования) «благотворительной акцией по сбору средств на термобелье для военных украинской армии, участвующих в АТО». Видимо спутали армию и школу.

Названия у сладостей, которые продавали школьникам, одно отвратительнее другого: «Танки на Москву», «Мозги Жириновского», «Кровь российских младенцев».

Страшно представить, что останется у детей в голове после того, как они съедят чьи-то «мозги» и запьют это «кровью российских младенцев». Примеры подобных чудовищных экспериментов над неокрепшей детской психикой и наивным сознанием можно найти в странах третьего мира:

Сьерра-Леоне: в 1991 году страна оказалась втянута в гражданскую войну в результате политического и социального противостояния в обществе. В ходе конфликта, который растянулся на 10 лет, противоборствующие силы постепенно втягивали в военные действия детей.

В составе одной из радикальных группировок — «Объединенного революционного фронта» — сражалось 10 тысяч подростков.

Их использовали для охраны складов оружия и алмазных месторождений. Чтобы разорвать связи похищенных подростков с родными селениями, их направляли для выполнения карательных операций и заставляли убивать кого-то из родственников или соседей (часто крайне жестоким образом).

По высказыванию одного из полевых командиров, детей легче, чем взрослых, довести до состояния, при котором они бездумно подчиняются и выполняют приказы: «Они верят, что это какая-то игра». В итоге жестокость детей-солдат ужаснула даже видавших виды взрослых. Только в столице государства Фритауне группа, именуемая «вестсайдские мальчики», искалечила 8000 человек.

Все это привело к полной деградации и разрушению общества. Приостановить кровопролитную гражданскую войну удалось лишь после введения на территорию Сьерра-Леоне британского и гвинейского военного контингента.

Уганда: В конце 1980-х страну охватил гражданский конфликт, в ходе которого была создана ультранационалистическая военная организация «Господня армия сопротивления». Ее цель — создание теократического государства на основе десяти библейских заповедей. По мнению руководителей этой организации, будущее общество надо формировать из несовершеннолетних, так как детей не тронули «грехи мира».

Представители «господней армии» похищали малышей и подростков из сельских поселений. Несовершеннолетние, возраст которых порой был 8 лет, составляли 70% «Господней армии сопротивления».

Постепенно движение просто-напросто стало массово вырезать католические общины, разбрасывая куски тел прямо в церквях. А регион охватил хаос.
Война перекинулась и на соседей — Судан, Демократическую Республику Конго. В Конго погибло 4 миллиона человек. Война привела к распаду Судана на две части. Конфликты сотрясают Уганду до сих пор.

Сомали: c конца 1980-х страну охватила гражданская война. Постепенно в конфликт стали втягивать и детей. Например, с 2004 года в стране действует организация «Харакат аш-Шабаб аль-Муджахидин» («Молодежное движение моджахедов»).

8 из 10 солдат этой военной группировки являются несовершеннолетними. Чтобы привлечь их в свои ряды, лидеры организации используют психологические манипуляции. Например, пишут музыку в западном стиле, вставляя в неё титры, призывающие к джихаду и вступлению в «повстанческие силы».

Сегодня слово «сомализация» превратилось в нарицательное. Оно обозначает полный развал и хаос государства. Само Сомали фактически существует только на картах. В реальности есть несколько независимых друг от друга и враждующих между собой регионов.

Камбоджа (Кампучия): С конца 1960-х годов в стране шла гражданская война. В ее ходе «красные кхмеры» во главе с Пол Потом сформировали отряды из подростков 12-15 лет, лишившихся родителей и ненавидевших горожан как «пособников американцев». При их помощи повстанцы захватили власть.

Результат деятельности полпотовцев, опирающихся на несовершеннолетних, известен: было уничтожено от 1 до 3 миллионов граждан при общей численности населения в 7 миллионов на начало 1970-х. Были разрушены 634 522 здания, в т.ч. 5 857 школ, а также 796 госпиталей, фельдшерских пунктов и лабораторий, 1 968 храмов, 108 мечетей.

В итоге «красные кхмеры» довели страну до полной разрухи (они систематически уничтожали города и всякую экономическую жизнь), втянули ее в войну с соседним Вьетнамом.
Характерно, что Запад не только не пытается противодействовать вовлечению детей в военные акции, несмотря на действующее международное право, но часто даже поощряет подобные процессы.

Косово: в конце 1990-х в албанской Армии освобождения Косово 10% бойцов были несовершеннолетними. Вашингтон и Брюссель поддерживал боевиков. Сегодня этот провозгласивший независимость регион живет за счет дотаций из-за рубежа. Через Косово проходит до 80% всех наркотиков, поставляемых в страны Европы.

Милитаризация детского сознания всегда вела к полной деградации общества и страны. Прибегавшая к подобным методам «элита» показывала свою беспомощность контролировать ситуацию и страх перед угрозой народных протестов.

Странным образом за спинами правителей, лидеров группировок, вовлекавших в войну детей, то и дело маячила тень Запада.
Схожая логическая цепочка выстраивается сегодня и в Украине.

Вначале назначают в правительство на ключевые посты финансово-экономического блока иностранцев (ставленников Вашингтона и Брюсселя). Потом начинаются штурмы государственных учреждений наэлектризованной толпой (в Виннице и Запорожье), демонстрирующих беспомощность руководства страны. Затем власть берется за детское сознание.

На очереди коллапс и полная сомализация страны.

Мнение автора может не совпадать с мнением редакции. Ответственность за цитаты, факты и цифры, приведенные в тексте, несет автор.

Сомали — это название страны, находящейся на одноимённом полуострове на востоке Африки. Сегодня это слово стало нарицательным, означающим разруху и беззаконие. Наверное, каждый знает, что Сомали — одно из самых опасных государств в мире, да и государством его можно назвать с натяжкой. На территории полуострова находится три относительно стабильных государственных образования и ещё с пяток ситуативных объединений, которые то появляются, то исчезают после очередного военного рейда.

О сомалийских пиратах все знают — эти ребята захватывают проходящие в территориальных водах суда и требуют выкуп. Этот промысел приносит местным (а скорее всего, и не только местным) бандформированиям более ста миллионов долларов ежегодно. Ещё о сбитом американском вертолёте известно всем — об этом событии даже неплохой фильм сняли. Но всё-таки, как же так вышло?

Почему в этом прекрасном с географической точки зрения месте царит хаос?

Научный социализм, но с рынком

Современная история большинства стран Африки начинается с какого-то одного человека, взявшего власть после колониальной эпохи и, как правило, просидевшего на троне 20–30 лет. В Сомали этим одним человеком стал Мохаммед Сиад Барре, пришедший к власти не сразу, но конечно же, в результате военного переворота в 1969 году. Предшественника застрелил его же личный телохранитель; туда же отправилось и большинство министров. Парламент, политические партии и общественные организации распустили. Барре объяснил переворот невозможностью более терпеть несправедливое распределение благ, взяточничество и непотизм.

С этого момента сомалийцы провозгласили курс на научный социализм и построение общества, основанного на труде и социальной справедливости. Советы одобряли, тут же отправив Барре помощь в виде военных советников и специалистов различных гражданских отраслей. Началась национализация нефтяного и банковского сектора, при том что практически все банки страны принадлежали иностранным государствам. Однако главные источники благосостояния среднего класса, вроде ферм и банановых плантаций, оставались в частных руках. Получался своеобразный гибрид плановой и рыночной экономики. Такая же гибридная форма устанавливалась в идеологическом поле, когда научный социализм пытались совместить с религией и культом личности. На улицах Могадишо в 70-х годах всюду можно было видеть плакаты с изображением Ленина, Маркса и Мохаммеда Барре рядом с ними. На другой стороне дороги вполне могла стоять мечеть и отделение банка.

Только в середине 70-х в Сомали появилась своя письменность — до того использовался итальянский, английский и ахмарский языки. Началась кампания по ликвидации безграмотности, осуществили довольно серьёзные экономические и технологические проекты (например, проект по закреплению песчаных дюн, угрожающих опустыниванием некоторым регионам). Модернизировали порты, в частности берберский, где некоторое время базировались военные и гражданские корабли СССР. Впрочем, социализм (тем более в Африке) не может обойтись без репрессий. В конституции закрепили однопартийную систему, а всякое инакомыслие подавлялось решительно.

Проект «Великое Сомали»

Сейчас для нас это звучит смешно, а в середине 70-х Мохаммед Сиад Барре относился к проекту вполне серьёзно. Да и смех, конечно, смехом, но уж лучше такая идея, чем классическое для Африки бесконечное личное обогащение. План предусматривал объединение всех коренных сомалийцев вместе с территориями, где они проживали. Таким образом Великое Сомали должно было получить часть Эфиопии, Кении и Джибути. Общая территория увеличивалась почти в два раза, а население достигало бы 17–20 миллионов человек. Что опять же не выглядит какой-то впечатляющей цифрой, но этот показатель не достигнут до сих пор.

В 1977-м в соседней Эфиопии наступил политический кризис, шла внутренняя борьба за власть. Мохаммед Барре, имея военное прошлое, понимал, что это лучший момент для реализации проекта. Началась война за регион Огаден — это, кстати, самый большой по площади регион Эфиопии. Несмотря на военные успехи первых недель, вскоре наступление провалилось. На помощь эфиопам пришли кубинцы и Советы, с которыми Барре разорвал отношения перед нападением. В те годы Эфиопия была одним из самых перспективных союзников СССР в Африке, к тому же это страна с православным населением.

Можно сказать, произошёл размен. Эфиопия, до того момента дружившая с США, после переворота поворачивается к СССР. Сомали поступает ровно наоборот: снимает портреты Ленина и Маркса, выдворяет советский флот и запускает новых, звёздно-полосатых, союзников. Позже Мохаммед Барре с сожалением заметит: «Вашингтон много обещает, но мало делает».

Поражение в войне с Эфиопией имело хоть и не мгновенные, но очень серьёзные последствия. Был нанесён удар по авторитету самого Барре, в результате начал падать уровень лояльности населения. Всякий раз у правительства находился только один действенный ответ: репрессии и жестокое подавление. Точкой невозврата стала бомбардировка Харгейсы в 1988 году. Правительственные войска несколько месяцев бомбили второй по численности город Сомали. В результате около 70 % зданий было разрушено, количество погибших неизвестно. С этого момента началась полномасштабная гражданская война.

Незаживающие шрамы

Сейчас на территории полуострова, помимо официального Сомали с переходным правительством, существует Пунтленд и Сомалиленд. Центральная власть контролирует не более трети страны. Это днём. Ну а ночью власть официального правительства распространяется лишь на столицу, да и то очень условно. Ярчайший тому пример — невозможность самостоятельного туризма в стране. Тебя просто не выпустят дальше блокпоста без вооружённой охраны из местных. Все видео о самостоятельном туризме в Сомали сняты именно в Сомалиленде и Пунтленде. Это тоже далеко не самые безопасные места на земле, но всё-таки более привыкшие к туризму хотя бы из-за плотных контактов с той же Эфиопией и Джибути.

Если взглянуть на карту, с удивлением можно обнаружить, что отколовшиеся от Сомали новые государственные образования почти идеально совпадают с границами бывших колониальных владений Италии и Британии. Сомалиленд почти на 100 % соответствует Британскому Сомали, а Пунтленду мешает центральное правительство, иначе это образование заняло бы обратно всю территорию бывшего Итальянского Сомали.

Вероятно, Сомали однажды будет записано как Failed State, или несостоявшееся государство. Власть в Могадишо не контролирует ситуацию настолько, что отколовшиеся территории не только имеют свою валюту, паспорта и другие государственные атрибуты, но и воюют между собой. Более того, в войнах за ресурсы непризнанные Пунтленд и Сомалиленд создают на территории Сомали всё новые марионеточные государства, которые существуют буквально несколько месяцев или пару лет, если какой-то полевой командир накопит достаточно «жирка». Если начать копаться в надежде установить, сколько же конкретно сейчас на территории Сомали государственных образований, то точную цифру найти не удастся. Может быть, 9 или 11, но это не точно. Сегодня образование есть, а завтра — уже нет, при этом послезавтра оно появляется вновь и заодно создаёт ещё пару сателлитов.

Естественно, подобная ситуация идеальна для прорастания террористических организаций и различных сект. Самый крупный в истории теракт произошёл в США — тогда погибло 2 977 человек. Второе место занимает взрыв в Могадишо в 2017 году — тогда погибло 587 человек. В ООН, конечно, озаботились и пожелали крепкого здоровья погибшим, но в общем-то, это и вся реакция. Представь, если бы подобное произошло где-то в Европе. Все мировые СМИ пару недель писали бы только об этой чудовищной трагедии! Аватарки в социальных сетях окрасились бы в цвета любого флага.

Ну а Сомали что? Там же эти живут, как их? Сомалийцы, в общем.

[источники]
https://brodude.ru/i/

Это копия статьи, находящейся по адресу https://masterokblog.ru/?p=69668.

Предостережения политологов о сомалийском сценарии для Украины прозвучали довольно рано, и потому долго не воспринимались всерьёз. Мы слишком привыкли к цивилизованности и не готовы верить в реальность подобной дикости. Общество вообще находилось под серьёзным влиянием либерального мифа о «демократической Украине», «сменяемой власти» и т. д. В самый последний момент прозрели, как ни странно, европейцы, тоже долго пребывавшие в ослеплении. Внезапно отбросив политес, забыв о субординации перед Штатами, они кинулись спасать ситуацию. И волновали их, конечно, не погибающие жители Донбасса, и уж точно не «демократические преобразования», а перспектива получить неуправляемый ад не где-то далеко, в Африке, а у себя на границе, на территории больше Франции и с населением Польши, куда Штаты для полного счастья собираются ещё и оружия подбросить.

Сегодня ночью мы все на один шаг к этой опасности приблизились. Перемирие, которого с таким трудом добивались в Минске мировые лидеры, было сорвано человеком по имени Ярош. Следует признать: накануне не получили должной оценки его заявления о том, что соблюдать режим прекращения огня «Правый сектор» не намерен, и что под его командование перешли 17 батальонов. В царившем последние три дня ажиотаже все ждали реакции «главных» игроков. Снова цивилизованность сыграла с нами злую шутку. Мы по привычке верим, что всем управляют политики, олигархи или на худой конец — спецслужбы. Мы гоним даже мимолётную мысль о полевых командирах, лидерах вооружённых группировок и самостийных армиях, подчинённых лишь самим себе.

Не стоит обольщаться кажущейся выгодой для Порошенко событий этой ночи. Действительно: вроде как официальный Киев получается «не при чём», а вот атакованным ополченцам приходится отбиваться, а, следовательно, они «нарушают». Люди, подобные Ярошу, действуют только в своих интересах. Даже если их действия кажутся выгодными в данный момент действующей власти или далёкому Вашингтону.

Настоящую угрозу с самого начала представляли так называемые «добровольческие отряды». О чём опять же понапрасну предупреждали политики и политологи. Собирать политически активную шваль, вооружать её, приучать к жизни «по законам войны», да ещё в условиях слабого государства, которое не в состоянии их контролировать — это была воистину плохая идея. Бомба замедленного действия, подложенная слабыми и бездумными киевскими властями под всю страну. Кстати, если кажется, что настоящей швали в этих батальонах не так уж много, то стоит учесть, что здесь тот самый случай, когда одна паршивая овца всё стадо портит. Был бы «положительный пример» перед глазами и вдохновляющая на анархию обстановка. Как долго будут совпадать интересы вооружённых людей и нынешней власти? Когда появится лидер, способный перехватить управление этой бандой? Сколько бойцов и оружия перейдёт к нему под руку? И к чему это всё приведёт?

Здесь надо понимать, что людей типа Яроша не волнует власть в привычном нам смысле. Кабинеты, виллы, департаменты, партии, подконтрольный бизнес — все эти игрушки цивилизации не нужны таким, как он. Их интересует власть оружия и бизнес совсем иного рода: производство и транзит наркотиков, работорговля, похищения ради выкупа, предоставление наёмников, содействие терроризму, контрабанде, бизнес с высокотоксичными отходами, которые за деньги так удачно можно сбросить в шахты или слить в море… Чёрная дыра, которую такие люди проделывают в правовом поле, моментально притягивает колоссальные денежные потоки и нелегальный бизнес всех видов, который «прижимают» в цивилизованных странах, где власть существует. Именно такую перспективу внезапно обнаружили пред собой Меркель и Олланд. И не удивительно, что даже самый жёсткий конфликт и скандал с Америкой поблёк в их глазах по сравнению с этой угрозой.

Все эти «Айдары», «Донбасы», «Азовы», сформированные из швали, никогда не знавшие настоящей армейской дисциплины, многажды преданные своими политиками и высшими командирами, очень легко могут пойти за человеком, который пообещает им настоящую власть, которую они уже отчасти успели вкусить — власть беспредела. «Жизнь для настоящих мужчин», «солдат удачи». Особенно если сверху всё это чуть-чуть загримировать идеями освободительного движения, отражения агрессии, предательских элит в столице, патриотизма и национализма.

По этому принципу сформирован и отлично действует ИГИЛ. Не стоит заблуждаться, что его опыт не анализируют сейчас в самых разных странах. И уж тем более не стоит думать, что подобные явления связаны с исламом. Это нормальная форма самоорганизации на территориях, не подчинённых нормальной, цивилизованной власти. А уж какой камуфляж они выбирают: религия, революция, контрреволюция — это зависит исключительно от готовности людей верить в ту или иную блажь.

Для запуска сомалийского сценария даже не требуется, чтобы под контроль Яроша и ему подобных перешли все вооружённые силы. Достаточно будет, если это окажется значимая их часть, способная в течение долгого времени существовать, контролировать свою территорию, и доказать наглядным образом, что всё это возможно. При нынешней киевской власти — абсолютно детская задача. Возникновение одного значительного отряда, ушедшего из-под контроля столицы и действующего самостоятельно и успешно (не в плане побед — вот уж на что плевать, — а в плане финансовой самодостаточности, сохранения независимости, обеспечения себя оружием и всем необходимым) очень быстро приведёт к тому, что подобной судьбы захотят и многие другие. Отнюдь не обязательно, чтобы все. Достаточно к потерянному Крыму и отделяющимся Донецку-Луганску, дестабилизировать ещё два-три крупных региона. И страна необратимо посыпется в неконтролируемый военно-бандитский (а разницы между ними уже и не будет) хаос.

Не подлежит сомнению, что этого в первую очередь не допустит Россия. Иметь такое на своей границе придётся в первую очередь нам. С другой стороны, кто наведёт порядок — тот и власть получит. Что естественно, учитывая каких колоссальных расходов будет стоить наведение этого порядка. А этого уже не хочет Европа. Поэтому тоже готова поучаствовать в наведении порядка. Учитывая упомянутый масштаб расходов, Россия едва ли будет возражать — этот чемодан без ручки в лице Украины нашим элитам уже чертовски опостылел за последние 20 лет. С другой стороны, памятуя всю украинскую историю, включая нынешнее положение дел, Москва точно будет требовать для себя гарантий не-превращения европейских протекторатов в антироссийские.

И тут мы уже плавно переходим к без пяти минут Ялтинской конференции (до чего же это было символично тогда в Минске, что совпало по дате). Своей недолгой историей Украина доказала, что не в состоянии обеспечить нормальную государственность на всей своей территории. Что, господа читатели? Цивилизованность, упомянутая в начале моего эссе, снова уже заставляет вас снова бежать под кров иллюзий? Это ужасно, не так ли? Так быть не должно? В XXI-ом веке, в Европе?.. Мне самому тоже очень бы этого не хотелось. Очень. Увы, приходится признать, что ломать — не строить, а Штаты имеют колоссальный опыт по части ломания государств. Я был бы рад верить и надеяться на тот крохотный и с каждым днём всё убывающий шанс для Украины уцелеть в этом историческом водовороте, в который она так радостно «прискакала», но действительность печальна: очень плохие тенденции мы наблюдаем, очень опасные, и очень мало веры, что киевская власть их преодолеет. А разброс интересов тех сфер влияния, которые воздействуют на Украину, не обнадёживают по части того, что они договорятся о новом формате страны, которая станет компромиссным решением, удовлетворяющим всех. Скорее, мы можем ожидать возникновения протекторатов, которые с течением времени окончательно разорвут страну.

Подобные опасения заставляют думать, что Европа пока явно недостаточно усилий прикладывает для успешного завершения украинской проблемы. Впрочем, отчасти тут имеет место и неизбежный, но абсолютно объективный расчёт на то, чтобы дать ситуации вызреть. Украине дают возможность всё таки сохранить себя при поддержке внешних сил, и вырулить из кризиса. Глобальные игроки будут рады возможности избежать масштабного конфликта, создающего к тому же кошмарный прецедент. Ради этого готовы и деньги предоставить, и немножко подзабыть про «невмешательство», и даже шикать на Штаты, которые очень рвутся подлить масла в этот огонь. Потому что в ином случае придётся всем принимать очень крутые меры для восстановлению порядка в регионе.

Единственное, в чём тут просчитались Штаты, когда провоцировали весь этот бардак у нас на границе: они не учли, что развитие по такому сценарию может очень серьёзно подорвать отношения с Европой. Думаю, что даже при положительном исходе там вряд ли забудут, какого страха пришлось натерпеться. К тому же, для положительного исхода всем надо ещё и выше головы теперь прыгнуть, а такое тоже не забывают.

The Somalia Affair was a 1993 military scandal later dubbed «Canada’s national shame».^[1] It peaked with the brutal beating death of a Somali teenager at the hands of two Canadian soldiers participating in humanitarian efforts in Somalia. The crime, documented by grisly photos, shocked the Canadian public and brought to light internal problems in the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Military leadership came into sharp rebuke after a CBC reporter received altered documents, leading to allegations of a cover-up.

Eventually a public inquiry was called. Despite being controversially cut short by the government, the Somalia Inquiry cited problems in the leadership of the Canadian Forces. The affair led to the disbanding of Canada’s elite Canadian Airborne Regiment, greatly damaging the morale of the Canadian Forces, and marring the domestic and international reputation of Canadian soldiers. It also led to the immediate reduction of Canadian military spending by nearly 25% from the time of the killing to the inquiry.^[1][2]

Background

In 1992, Somalia was in the middle of both famine and civil war, and the country was largely embroiled in chaos and domination by warlords, following the collapse of Siad Barre’s Marxist government. Relief supplies were frequently stolen by armed gangs, who would hold the goods hostage for the loyalty of the population. As a result, the United Nations requested armed peacekeepers to assist the relief operations.

In the summer of 1992, Brian Mulroney would commit Canada to United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). Canada was being pressured to make this decision because in the past it had aggressively engaged in Yugoslavia in 1992 and had reached out to Balkan refugees later that year.^[3] The heightened media coverage on Somalia had also put more pressure on the Canadian government to mobilize a peacekeeping effort. Thanks to the Mulroney government’s desire to improve conflict resolution mechanisms and for its natural interest in multilateralism and peacekeeping, Canada found the Somali Civil War to fit its foreign policy priorities. Brian Mulroney was himself a ‘Pearsonian’ and a multilateralist who would have a great deal of confidence in the United Nations.^[3] Canadian diplomat Geoffrey Pearson argued that “effective multilateral arrangements provide a means to exert influence on major allies and powerful neighbours as well as help maintain peace”.^[3] Mulroney’s notion of new internationalism coupled with this notion of multilateralism would see intervention as a moral imperative in cases of intrastate disorder and large-scale human rights abuse.^[3] He commented that it would be ideal for the United Nations to become still more effective and more of an actor in international affairs, since there are certain fundamental rights that all people possess and these should be defended by the international community.^[3]

Contributing to the US-led coalition and taking part in the UN force to Somalia seemed to align with Canadian foreign policy and fit Mulroney’s vision for peacekeeping, as he was the «principal driver behind Canada’s decision to commit itself to the Somalia mission».^[3]

Canada would then be among the nations that agreed to send forces. The Minister of External Affairs Barbara McDougall noted that the mandate would be to «shoot first, ask questions later» to try to bring peace to the country.^[4] Canadian forces, under the name Operation Deliverance, were sent to Somalia to participate in the American-led Operation Restore Hope.^[5] On 4 May 1993, the operation was to come under UN command and was renamed UNOSOM II.

It was decided that the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) would be the contingent sent overseas. The Airborne had long been seen as the elite of the Canadian Forces, and in 1974 had performed admirably in combat operations in Cyprus as well as later peacekeeping tours there. However, General Beno informed General Lewis MacKenzie that training in the CAR was a «critical» problem due to Paul Morneault‘s leadership.^[6] It was debated whether to substitute another regiment, or cancel the mission entirely, but it was finally decided that to admit that the «elite» Canadian forces were incapable of handling a routine mission would have been a «national disgrace».^[6]

Canadian Airborne Regiment

Only recently deemed a light infantry battalion, some leaders expressed concern that the Somalia mission did not fit the Regiment’s mandate or abilities. The Airborne consisted of multiple sub-units drawn from each of Canada’s regular infantry regiments. Later, Lt. Col. Kenward suggested that the line regiments had offloaded some of their «bad apples» into the CAR. Lt. Col. Morneault, the commanding officer of the CAR, declared the «rogue commando» unit unfit for service abroad and sought to have it remain in Canada. Instead, he was relieved of his command and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Carol Mathieu.^[8]

There had been recurring discipline problems, and an ongoing investigation into their base of CFB Petawawa as a hotbed of white supremacist activity in 2 Commando.^[9] This included the adoption of the Rebel flag as the commando’s barracks-room decoration.^[10] The flag had initially been presented as a gift from American soldiers, and gradually became an unofficial symbol, although successive commanding officers had tried to ban its usage.^[6]

Footage depicting racist actions of Cpl. McKay and Pte. Brocklebank was later brought forward by Scott Taylor, who hoped to expose systematic problems in the military and exonerate his friend Kyle Brown.^[11] In the video, McKay can be heard uttering racial slurs,^[12] and pre-deployment photographs showed him wearing a Hitler shirt in front of a Swastika.^[13] Brocklebank was seen «uttering racist and violent epithets on a video taken by [CAR] soldiers».^[14]

Video of brutal hazing rituals also came to light, including a video from the summer of 1992 which showed 1 Commando engaging in «hijinks» ranging from smearing faeces on each other, to bestiality; the black soldier Christopher Robin was shown on all fours with a leash, led around like a dog, with the phrase «I Love KKK» written on his back, while surrounding soldiers screamed about White Power and jeered, one demonstrating his objection to Black soldiers in the Airborne through racist language.^[6][15][16]

Mike Abel, the only Canadian to die in the Somali operation, was alleged a member of the KKK; although colleagues disputed the evidence that racist literature had been found in his belongings, pointing out that it just floated around the camp and everybody read it.^[17][18]

Airborne in Somalia

The CAR was deployed in December 1992, accompanied by a helicopter squadron and a squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. Although they were planning to deploy to the comparatively quiet port city of Bosaso, four days after arriving in Somalia commander Serge Labbé informed them that consultation with the Americans meant they would be moving to the southern town of Belet Huen, considered one of the more difficult areas to patrol.^[19]

One of the first tasks of the Dragoons, under command of Sgt. Donald Hobbs, was to rebuild a bridge that had been destroyed on the Chinese Highway linking Belet Huen and Matabaan. With the loss of the bridge, the only way around was through a partially cleared minefield.^[20]

On January 2, Canadian forces seized an AK-47 from a local Somali who returned the following day with a machete to threaten the troops to give him back his gun; a warning shot was fired and ricocheted, hitting him in the foot. He left, refusing medical care.^[20] Also in January 1993, Captain Roy D. Commander of the elite pathfinder unit, gave verbal orders allowing Canadian soldiers to shoot thieves under certain conditions.^[6] On January 29, suspected bandits were found congregating on a roadway and as Canadian forces approached them, they began to flee. Warning shots were fired into the air to halt them, leading to a retaliatory shot from a Somali, and returned fire from the Canadian troops.^[20]

On February 10, they fired on a crowd approaching a Red Cross distribution centre.^[6]

On February 17, a demonstration of 50-300 Somalis crowded together on the bailey bridge over the Shebelle River, and when some began throwing rocks at the Canadian Forces, soldiers fired two shotgun blasts, killing one Somali and injuring two others. A later investigation cleared the shooters of any wrongdoing, noting they were justified in their response.^{[6][14][20][21]}

By the end of the mission, no Canadian troops had been killed or wounded by enemy forces; the sole casualties arising when a soldier shot himself in the arm while cleaning his sidearm on January 11,^[20] and when MCpl. Tony Smith negligently discharged his rifle, fatally wounding Cpl. Abel on May 3, 1993.^[22]

March 4 killing

On March 4, two unarmed Somalis were shot in the back,^[23] one fatally, after Canadian troops laid an ambush to try to catch petty thieves stealing from the military base in Belet Huen. This followed from a decision by Captain Michel Rainville to re-label petty theft by Somalis as «sabotage», a distinction that meant deadly force could be used to defend the base.^[6] Rainville relied on the argument that a fuel pump used to service American MedEvac helicopters had been stolen deliberately to hinder the military effort, while critics pointed out that any saboteurs likely would have ignited the thousands of gallons of fuel surrounding it.^[6]

After Warrant Officer Marsh discovered the missing fuel pump, he suggested installing a large searchlight atop a tower to deter thieves. He was dismissed by Rainville, who suggested that the idea was not to deter thieves, but to catch them in the act using night vision.^[20] Rainville ordered that food and water be placed in a trailer at the south end of the compound, visible to Somalis walking past on the nearby road. Some soldiers alleged this constituted «bait», but Rainville would later defend himself saying it had been to distinguish between thieves and saboteurs to prevent shooting thieves.^[20]

Rainville enlisted Cpl. Ben Klick of the PPCLI to lay in a truckbed at night, awaiting potential «saboteurs» with a C3A1 rifle.^[20] From his position, he watched two Somalis, Ahmed Arush and Abdi Hunde Bei Sabrie, approach the food and water that the Canadians had laid out as bait. Fifteen minutes after first noticing the pair, the thieves began to run from the base in fear they had been noticed; Rainville yelled at them to «stop», and called to Sgt. Plante, Cpl. King and Cpl. Favasoli to «get them».^[20] Plante fired with his shotgun, while King fired with his C7; Plante’s shot wounded Sabrie, who fell to the ground, while Arush kept running back towards the roadway. Cpl Leclerc and MCpl Countway both shot at him as he ran, although Cpl. Klick had refrained noting that the man presented no risk to Canadian forces. Arush fell to the ground, hit by one of the two men’s shots. He struggled to stand up, but both men fired again, killing him.^[20]

It was noted that Sabrie had been carrying a ceremonial dagger in his clothing.^[20][24] When the unit was ordered to bring the dead body of Arush be brought over to the same position as Sabrie, the soldiers radioed back that they couldn’t move the body without it falling apart.^[20] So the body of Arush was loaded into a body bag and placed inside a Bison personnel carrier.^[6] There, medical technician MCpl Petersen re-opened the bag and took Polaroid photographs for an unknown reason, some suggest to document the shooting, others suggest as a «trophy».^[6] The photos showed gaping wounds in Arush’s neck and the side of his face, with his skull twisted out of shape by the force of the gunblast. His intestines protruded from his stomach, and his right eye is missing.^[6]

An Air Force flight surgeon, Major Barry Armstrong, examined the body and judged the death «suspicious», suggesting that Arush had been lying prone on the ground when he was killed.^[6] He also noted that the amount of omentum which had passed through the first wounds suggested the 29-year-old Arush had been breathing for at least 2 or 3 minutes before the final gunshots to his head were fired.^[24]

After the examination, Arush’s body was then used for medical practice for soldiers, demonstrating how to stab a tracheotomy into a wounded man’s throat to allow him to breathe, and then used to demonstrate the proper preparation of a body for transportation. The body was then returned to the body bag, and sent into the local hospital, where Dr. Xelen released it to Arush’s family the same evening.^[6][20] For the next two weeks, Colonel Allan Wells approached Vice-Admiral Larry Murray asking to send military police to Somalia to investigate the shooting, but was rebuffed.^[6] When the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral John Rogers Anderson, visited the military base on March 8–9, he visited the wounded Somali recovering in the Canadian hospital.^[6]

The event would not have been reported, except that Member of Parliament John Brewin read out an anonymous letter he had received from a soldier about witnessing the «execution» of a Somali civilian on March 4.^[1]

At the subsequent inquiry, Klick defended Rainville, heavily criticising his commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu, and testified that American Special Forces Chief Warrant Officer Jackson had interrogated the wounded Somali who confessed to being a saboteur; although this contradicted all other evidence, including the statements of the American soldier who never mentioned any interrogation.^[6][20] In 1994, the Ministry of Defence engaged in an undercover attempt to discredit Armstrong’s findings, phoning Allan Thompson of the Toronto Star and offering to leak to him the pathology report by James Ferris conducted two months after the killing, which found the decomposing body showed none of the signs Armstrong had suggested. Thompson took his evidence of a preconceived «leak» from the Ministry to the subsequent inquiry, where they added weight to Armstrong’s findings.^[6] While his commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu described Armstrong as bordering on insanity at the inquiry, the only evidence he produced was that he liked to climb onto the roof of the hospital at night in Somalia and watch the stars.^[6]

Death of Shidane Arone

On March 16, 1993, Captain Michael Sox found Shidane Abukar Arone hiding in a portable toilet in an abandoned American base across from the Canadian base and, believing he was attempting to sneak into the Canadian base to steal supplies, turned him over to another soldier, who led the teenager to a bunker being used to house munitions.^[9][25] Arone protested, claiming he had simply been trying to find a lost child.^[9][14]

At 21:00, Sgt. Mark Boland replaced Master Corporal Clayton Matchee as guard of the prisoner, and ordered that his foot bindings be removed, and replaced with fetters as the ropes were too tight.^[14] Warrant Officer Murphy took the opportunity to kick Arone «savagely», which was later claimed to be implicit permission to abuse the prisoner.^[14] At this time, Matchee began his abuse of Arone by removing the captive’s clothing and using it to crudely waterboard the youth until Boland objected, and Matchee left the bunker.^[14]

At 22:00, Trooper Kyle Brown took over guard duty, and brought Matchee back with him. Brown punched Arone in the jaw, and was told by Boland, rather prophetically, «I don’t care what you do, just don’t kill the guy», to which Brown replied that he wanted to «kill this fucker».^[14] Boland then joined Matchee and Matt McKay for beers in the mess hall, where Matchee spoke about what he wanted to do to Arone, and suggested he might put out cigarette butts on his feet. McKay suggested that Matchee might use a ration pack or phone book to beat the youth, as it would not leave any traces.^[14]

Matchee and Brown, both members of 2 Commando, then proceeded to beat Arone.^[25] Matchee used a ration pack to beat the youth, as well as a broomstick, and sodomised the teenager with it.^[14][26] Brown participated in the abuse, but was primarily an observer and took sixteen «trophy photos» of the beating, including one of Matchee forcing Arone’s mouth open with a baton, and one of himself holding Pte. David Brocklebank’s loaded pistol to Arone’s head.^{[14][27][28][29]} At approximately 23:20, Master Cpl. Giasson entered the bunker, Matchee showed him Arone, who was now semi-conscious and bleeding, and boasted that «in Canada we cannot do that, and here they let us do it».^[14]

Estimates have ranged from 15-80 other soldiers could hear or observe the beating, but did not intervene.^[14][25] Corporal MacDonald, acting as duty signaller that night, was asked by Sgt. Major Mills about «a long dragged out howl» heard from the vicinity of the bunker, but MacDonald refused to stop playing Game Boy to investigate. Later, Matchee came by to borrow a cigarette from MacDonald and mentioned that «now the Black man would fear the Indian as he did the white man», and MacDonald went outside to check on Arone’s status. He saw Matchee hitting him in the face with the baton, and reported that the prisoner was «getting a good shit-kicking» to Sgt. Perry Gresty, before retiring to bed for the night.^[14]

Arone fell unconscious after several hours of beatings, after shouting «Canada! Canada! Canada!» as his last words.^[25] When Brown mentioned the event to Sergeant J.K. Hillier, the non-commissioned officer noted there «would be trouble» if the prisoner died, and went to check on the youth whom he found had no pulse, and base medics confirmed that the boy was dead.^[14] It was later discovered that Arone had burn marks on his penis.^[26]

Response

Jim Day, a reporter with the Pembroke Observer local newspaper from the regiment’s hometown, was on the base at the time and was the first to report that Canadian soldiers were being held pending an investigation into the death of a Somali citizen.^[1]

The debate over what led to the events came at a politically sensitive time in Canada, as the Minister of National Defence Kim Campbell was in the midst of a Progressive Conservative Party of Canada leadership campaign to become Prime Minister.^[11] Matters were made worse when Campbell tried to dismiss the allegations of racism in the Canadian military by referring to it as «youthful folly» and suggesting that it was commonplace.^[11] Criticism also focused on the fact that it took five weeks to order a high-level investigation into the events in Somalia.

Some, including Member of Parliament John Cummins, quickly pointed out that three of the four men facing the most serious charges had been given experimental injections of Lariam, a brand-name of Mefloquine, to test its effects on combatting malaria in a controlled study group. The drug was known to cause paranoia, lack of judgment, neurosis and other mental side effects, and some have suggested it bore some responsibility for the soldiers’ actions.^[17] Dr. Michele Brill-Edwards had actually resigned in protest from Health Canada over her belief that the drug could produce «dangerous psychiatric reactions» in the soldiers.^[17]

Legal proceedings

A death in custody automatically triggered an investigation, and two days later Matchee and Brown were arrested and charged with the murder and National Defence Headquarters was advised.

Matchee later attempted to hang himself in his cell; the attempt failed but caused massive brain damage, making him unfit to stand trial.

McAuliffe’s request for documents

In September 1995, CBC reporter Michael McAuliffe requested access to 68 Response to Query forms to supplement his earlier informal gleanings about the Canadian military operation, but the documents were altered before being released to him, in order to make them agree with the information he’d been given earlier.^[6] In addition, invented financial charges were tagged onto his request, claiming that it had taken 413 man-hours and subsequently would cost McAuliffe $4,080, although the documents were in fact readily available.^[32][33][34]

While giving McAuliffe misinformation informally was not illegal, it was a crime for the government to release forged documents in response to an Access to Information request.^[6] The question quickly emerged of whether Chief of Defence Staff Jean Boyle had known about the altering, and if he bore responsibility for it even if he were ignorant of his underlings’ doings.^[6] On September 5, 1995, a clerk at the NDHQ was discovered collecting Somalia-related documents for a burn bag to be destroyed.^[6] Boyle later concurred that there had been documents proving attempts to cover up details of both the May 4 and May 16 killings.^[10][35]

Somalia Inquiry

The public outcry against Arone’s death didn’t occur until November 1994, when a publication ban was lifted against the 16 photographs Brown had taken of the torture session and they were widely published in Canadian media.^[11]

The new government of Jean Chrétien‘s Liberal Party initiated a highly visible Somalia Inquiry in 1994 under Federal Court Judge Gilles Létourneau. Officially known as the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, its hearings were broadcast daily in both languages, nationally.

As the inquiry unfolded, home videos of initiation rites in the CAR’s French-speaking commando found their way into the media. The new Minister of National Defence David Collenette argued that the videos were disgusting, demeaning and racist. With the continued accumulation of such politically damaging visibility, the Minister of National Defence advised Governor General Roméo LeBlanc to disband the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 1995. It has been suggested^{[by whom?]} that this move was as much driven by budget cuts to the Canadian Forces as by the Somalia Affair, but there is no question that the affair gave the minister the public support needed to make his request for disbandment.

The Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain, who had not supported the minister’s disbandment order of the Airborne, resigned under a cloud. His successor, Air Force General Jean Boyle was forced to resign only a few months after accepting the role when, in a gesture uncharacteristic of military tradition, he blamed his subordinates for previous wrongdoing under his command. Minister of National Defence David Collenette was also forced to resign, partially due to the affair.

On April 8, 1996, Boyle called a halt to all normal duties and announced the entire Canadian military would begin searching for documents relating to Somalia.^[6]

The inquiry ran until 1997 when it was cut short by the government in the months before the 1997 election. The government was critical of the direction of the inquiry, noting that it was far exceeding its mandate.^[23] Member of Parliament Art Eggleton — who went on to become Minister of National Defence after the 1997 election — suggested that the events had happened four years earlier, and it was time to «move on».^[23]

Indeed, the conduct of the new government after the Somalia affair and the search for documents now absorbed much of the inquiry’s attention, as reflected in its report. The inquiry had run long over its allotted timeframe and budget. The decision to end the inquiry received visible media attention and may have contributed to the defeat of the new Defence Minister Doug Young in the 1997 election. The inquiry was never able to examine top level governmental decision-making, nor did it actually examine the alleged events in Somalia.

The final report of the inquiry was a striking attack on the procedures, support and leadership of the Canadian Forces and the Ministry of Defence. Many of the top officers in the Canadian Forces were excoriated, including three separate Chiefs of the Defence Staff. The CAR had been rushed into a war zone with inadequate preparation or legal support. Enquiry observer retired Brigadier-General Dan Loomis noted that the operation had changed, in December 1992, «from a peacekeeping operation, where arms are used only in self-defence, to one where arms could be used proactively to achieve politico-military objectives…In short the Canadian Forces were being put on active service and sent to war (as defined by Chapter 7 of the UN Charter).» Its deployment into «war» had never been debated in parliament and indeed the Canadian public had been led to believe by its government that the CAR was on a «peacekeeping» mission. After the events the leaders of the Canadian Forces had been far more concerned with self-preservation than in trying to find the truth. The inquiry report singled out Major-General Lewis MacKenzie as a major exception, as he took full responsibility for any errors he made.

Aftermath of the Affair

The affair had a number of long lasting effects. While it is difficult to separate the effects of the affair on Canadian Forces morale from those of the concurrent defence spending cut, it did exacerbate feelings of distrust towards the media and politicians among many CF members.

At the same time, public trust in the Canadian Forces suffered and recruitment became more difficult. Public revulsion provided support for the sharp cuts to military spending introduced by the Liberal government. Many of the report’s comments, along with the sustained media criticism of the military, led to the hasty imposition of policies designed to ensure nothing similar to the Somalia Affair could happen again. It has been argued^{[by whom?]} that many of these practices, such as the micro-management of training, operations and disciplinary processes from NDHQ and the resultant restrictions on commanding officers, hamper the flexibility of operational units. Since the events in Somalia, Canada has become far less ready to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping efforts.^{[citation needed]} Once playing an important role in the majority of UN efforts, in subsequent years Canada simply provided indirect support. Post 2001 though, spending on the Canadian Forces gradually increased and accelerated as Canada played a major role in Afghanistan. Concurrently public perception of the Canadian Forces improved dramatically as well.

In 1999, judge J. Douglas Cunningham dismissed an appeal for financial compensation by Arone’s parents Abubakar Arone Rage and Dahabo Omar Samow, ruling that their use of a litigation guardian, Abdullahi Godah Barre, was inconsistent with the legal requirement, and they should have traveled to Canada to launch the suit themselves.^[5][36]

Brown later co-operated on a book in which it was suggested he had been made the scapegoat for the incident and the officers who had not intervened were not brought to justice.^[26]

Soldiers of other countries also faced charges of misconduct; American soldiers were involved in the deaths of three young boys in separate incidents,^[37] Pakistani troops were accused of a number of civilian deaths,^[37] and Belgian soldiers took photographs of themselves allegedly torturing a Somali to death.^[37]

Other long term effects on the Forces included the adoption of sensitivity training, including SHARP (Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention) training, which became mandatory for every single member of the Forces, and was accompanied by a declaration of «zero tolerance» on racism and harassment of any kind, including hazing.

Some have suggested that Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Commissioner Joseph Philip Robert Murray was slated to be replaced, until Boyle was removed — making it difficult for the Prime Minister to simultaneously replace the head of the armed forces and the head of the federal police.^[38]

Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention in the wake of The Somalia Affair

The notion of peacekeeping seems to be deeply embedded in Canadian culture and a distinguishing feature that Canadians feel sets their foreign policy apart from the likes of the United States. The Somalia commission wrote in 1997 that “Canada’s foreign policy with respect to peacekeeping has been consistent since Canadians embraced peacekeeping in the late 1950s”.^[39] Since the Suez Crisis, Canadian foreign policy has fit a peacekeeping rubric. Americans however were seen to fight wars, but Canadians pictured themselves as working for peace.^[39] Canada never had a reputation for starting wars but instead was seen to come to the aid of war torn countries.

The Somalia Affair came as such as surprise to the Canadian public as no one would have thought Canada’s golden reputation for international peacekeeping could be tarnished. The Somalia Affair and the ensuing commission of inquiry has become the subject of intense criticism and has given rise to a great deal of comparative theoretical work on humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. In her book Sherene Razack asks if it was just a case of ‘a few bad apples’ in the Canadian forces, or if the Somalia Affair speaks to a larger issue on the complex nature of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention.^[40] Thomas Weiss comments that the failures in Somalia have led to this concept of ‘Somalia Syndrome’: “multilateral interventions to thwart starvation, genocide, the forced movement of peoples, and massive violations of fundamental rights are no longer politically or operationally feasible”.^[41] Peacekeepers are more likely to be involved in peace enforcement in more warlike conditions as unlike traditional peacekeeping; there is not always consent from all the conflicting parties.^[40] Such was the case in Somalia as the men were hypervigilent with a sense of fear and frustration as they were trained for combat yet charged with providing humanitarian aid.^[40] Faced with this strong Somali opposition and resentment and yet being responsible for providing aid meant that Canadian peacekeepers “increasingly could not find meaning in their activities” ^[40] There would be a ‘Somalia syndrome’ sentiment that would linger in the international community after the failures in the war torn country. Weiss however reminds us not to take Somalia out of context or draw upon the wrong lessons leading to isolationism or eschewing necessary humanitarian intervention. The debacle in Somalia would be so paralyzing that it would lead to an unwillingness from the international community to respond to future problems, like the Rwandan Genocide. The United States under the Clinton Administration would need to rethink its foreign policies and the rest of the world just did not want another Somalia Affair ^[41]

The Somalia Affair thus had a direct impact on how the international community would make foreign policy with a crippling ‘Somalia syndrome’ that would lead to the sense of caution in intervening in the Rwanda Genocide and in the Balkans.

See also

• Bystander effect
• Command responsibility
• List of Canadian military operations
• List of Canadian Peacekeeping Missions

References

Further reading

• Grant Dawson (2007). «Here is hell»: Canada’s engagement in Somalia. UBC Press. ISBN 978-0-7748-1297-9. http://books.google.com/books?id=eHe9h45lyQoC&pg=PP1.
• Sherene Razack (2004). Dark threats and white knights: the Somalia Affair, peacekeeping, and the new imperialism. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-0-8020-8663-1. http://books.google.com/books?id=Kc6K0T58yMsC&pg=PP1.
• Mock, Karen R. U.S. Department of Education, The Somalia Inquiry: What Does It Have to Do with Us?, 1996

External links

• Canadian Broadcast Standards Council, Canada AM: Airborne Hazing, complaint brought by a viewer to CTV’s decision to broadcast hazing footage she deemed «too explicit».
• CBC Archives — The Somalia Affair
• Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia

The Somalia Affair was a 1993 military scandal later dubbed «Canada’s national shame».^[1] It peaked with the brutal beating death of a Somali teenager at the hands of two Canadian soldiers participating in humanitarian efforts in Somalia. The crime, documented by grisly photos, shocked the Canadian public and brought to light internal problems in the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Military leadership came into sharp rebuke after a CBC reporter received altered documents, leading to allegations of a cover-up.

Eventually a public inquiry was called. Despite being controversially cut short by the government, the Somalia Inquiry cited problems in the leadership of the Canadian Forces. The affair led to the disbanding of Canada’s elite Canadian Airborne Regiment, greatly damaging the morale of the Canadian Forces, and marring the domestic and international reputation of Canadian soldiers. It also led to the immediate reduction of Canadian military spending by nearly 25% from the time of the killing to the inquiry.^[1][2]

Background

In 1992, Somalia was in the middle of both famine and civil war, and the country was largely embroiled in chaos and domination by warlords, following the collapse of Siad Barre’s Marxist government. Relief supplies were frequently stolen by armed gangs, who would hold the goods hostage for the loyalty of the population. As a result, the United Nations requested armed peacekeepers to assist the relief operations.

In the summer of 1992, Brian Mulroney would commit Canada to United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). Canada was being pressured to make this decision because in the past it had aggressively engaged in Yugoslavia in 1992 and had reached out to Balkan refugees later that year.^[3] The heightened media coverage on Somalia had also put more pressure on the Canadian government to mobilize a peacekeeping effort. Thanks to the Mulroney government’s desire to improve conflict resolution mechanisms and for its natural interest in multilateralism and peacekeeping, Canada found the Somali Civil War to fit its foreign policy priorities. Brian Mulroney was himself a ‘Pearsonian’ and a multilateralist who would have a great deal of confidence in the United Nations.^[3] Canadian diplomat Geoffrey Pearson argued that “effective multilateral arrangements provide a means to exert influence on major allies and powerful neighbours as well as help maintain peace”.^[3] Mulroney’s notion of new internationalism coupled with this notion of multilateralism would see intervention as a moral imperative in cases of intrastate disorder and large-scale human rights abuse.^[3] He commented that it would be ideal for the United Nations to become still more effective and more of an actor in international affairs, since there are certain fundamental rights that all people possess and these should be defended by the international community.^[3]

Contributing to the US-led coalition and taking part in the UN force to Somalia seemed to align with Canadian foreign policy and fit Mulroney’s vision for peacekeeping, as he was the «principal driver behind Canada’s decision to commit itself to the Somalia mission».^[3]

Canada would then be among the nations that agreed to send forces. The Minister of External Affairs Barbara McDougall noted that the mandate would be to «shoot first, ask questions later» to try to bring peace to the country.^[4] Canadian forces, under the name Operation Deliverance, were sent to Somalia to participate in the American-led Operation Restore Hope.^[5] On 4 May 1993, the operation was to come under UN command and was renamed UNOSOM II.

It was decided that the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) would be the contingent sent overseas. The Airborne had long been seen as the elite of the Canadian Forces, and in 1974 had performed admirably in combat operations in Cyprus as well as later peacekeeping tours there. However, General Beno informed General Lewis MacKenzie that training in the CAR was a «critical» problem due to Paul Morneault‘s leadership.^[6] It was debated whether to substitute another regiment, or cancel the mission entirely, but it was finally decided that to admit that the «elite» Canadian forces were incapable of handling a routine mission would have been a «national disgrace».^[6]

Canadian Airborne Regiment

Only recently deemed a light infantry battalion, some leaders expressed concern that the Somalia mission did not fit the Regiment’s mandate or abilities. The Airborne consisted of multiple sub-units drawn from each of Canada’s regular infantry regiments. Later, Lt. Col. Kenward suggested that the line regiments had offloaded some of their «bad apples» into the CAR. Lt. Col. Morneault, the commanding officer of the CAR, declared the «rogue commando» unit unfit for service abroad and sought to have it remain in Canada. Instead, he was relieved of his command and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Carol Mathieu.^[8]

There had been recurring discipline problems, and an ongoing investigation into their base of CFB Petawawa as a hotbed of white supremacist activity in 2 Commando.^[9] This included the adoption of the Rebel flag as the commando’s barracks-room decoration.^[10] The flag had initially been presented as a gift from American soldiers, and gradually became an unofficial symbol, although successive commanding officers had tried to ban its usage.^[6]

Footage depicting racist actions of Cpl. McKay and Pte. Brocklebank was later brought forward by Scott Taylor, who hoped to expose systematic problems in the military and exonerate his friend Kyle Brown.^[11] In the video, McKay can be heard uttering racial slurs,^[12] and pre-deployment photographs showed him wearing a Hitler shirt in front of a Swastika.^[13] Brocklebank was seen «uttering racist and violent epithets on a video taken by [CAR] soldiers».^[14]

Video of brutal hazing rituals also came to light, including a video from the summer of 1992 which showed 1 Commando engaging in «hijinks» ranging from smearing faeces on each other, to bestiality; the black soldier Christopher Robin was shown on all fours with a leash, led around like a dog, with the phrase «I Love KKK» written on his back, while surrounding soldiers screamed about White Power and jeered, one demonstrating his objection to Black soldiers in the Airborne through racist language.^[6][15][16]

Mike Abel, the only Canadian to die in the Somali operation, was alleged a member of the KKK; although colleagues disputed the evidence that racist literature had been found in his belongings, pointing out that it just floated around the camp and everybody read it.^[17][18]

Airborne in Somalia

The CAR was deployed in December 1992, accompanied by a helicopter squadron and a squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. Although they were planning to deploy to the comparatively quiet port city of Bosaso, four days after arriving in Somalia commander Serge Labbé informed them that consultation with the Americans meant they would be moving to the southern town of Belet Huen, considered one of the more difficult areas to patrol.^[19]

One of the first tasks of the Dragoons, under command of Sgt. Donald Hobbs, was to rebuild a bridge that had been destroyed on the Chinese Highway linking Belet Huen and Matabaan. With the loss of the bridge, the only way around was through a partially cleared minefield.^[20]

On January 2, Canadian forces seized an AK-47 from a local Somali who returned the following day with a machete to threaten the troops to give him back his gun; a warning shot was fired and ricocheted, hitting him in the foot. He left, refusing medical care.^[20] Also in January 1993, Captain Roy D. Commander of the elite pathfinder unit, gave verbal orders allowing Canadian soldiers to shoot thieves under certain conditions.^[6] On January 29, suspected bandits were found congregating on a roadway and as Canadian forces approached them, they began to flee. Warning shots were fired into the air to halt them, leading to a retaliatory shot from a Somali, and returned fire from the Canadian troops.^[20]

On February 10, they fired on a crowd approaching a Red Cross distribution centre.^[6]

On February 17, a demonstration of 50-300 Somalis crowded together on the bailey bridge over the Shebelle River, and when some began throwing rocks at the Canadian Forces, soldiers fired two shotgun blasts, killing one Somali and injuring two others. A later investigation cleared the shooters of any wrongdoing, noting they were justified in their response.^{[6][14][20][21]}

By the end of the mission, no Canadian troops had been killed or wounded by enemy forces; the sole casualties arising when a soldier shot himself in the arm while cleaning his sidearm on January 11,^[20] and when MCpl. Tony Smith negligently discharged his rifle, fatally wounding Cpl. Abel on May 3, 1993.^[22]

March 4 killing

On March 4, two unarmed Somalis were shot in the back,^[23] one fatally, after Canadian troops laid an ambush to try to catch petty thieves stealing from the military base in Belet Huen. This followed from a decision by Captain Michel Rainville to re-label petty theft by Somalis as «sabotage», a distinction that meant deadly force could be used to defend the base.^[6] Rainville relied on the argument that a fuel pump used to service American MedEvac helicopters had been stolen deliberately to hinder the military effort, while critics pointed out that any saboteurs likely would have ignited the thousands of gallons of fuel surrounding it.^[6]

After Warrant Officer Marsh discovered the missing fuel pump, he suggested installing a large searchlight atop a tower to deter thieves. He was dismissed by Rainville, who suggested that the idea was not to deter thieves, but to catch them in the act using night vision.^[20] Rainville ordered that food and water be placed in a trailer at the south end of the compound, visible to Somalis walking past on the nearby road. Some soldiers alleged this constituted «bait», but Rainville would later defend himself saying it had been to distinguish between thieves and saboteurs to prevent shooting thieves.^[20]

Rainville enlisted Cpl. Ben Klick of the PPCLI to lay in a truckbed at night, awaiting potential «saboteurs» with a C3A1 rifle.^[20] From his position, he watched two Somalis, Ahmed Arush and Abdi Hunde Bei Sabrie, approach the food and water that the Canadians had laid out as bait. Fifteen minutes after first noticing the pair, the thieves began to run from the base in fear they had been noticed; Rainville yelled at them to «stop», and called to Sgt. Plante, Cpl. King and Cpl. Favasoli to «get them».^[20] Plante fired with his shotgun, while King fired with his C7; Plante’s shot wounded Sabrie, who fell to the ground, while Arush kept running back towards the roadway. Cpl Leclerc and MCpl Countway both shot at him as he ran, although Cpl. Klick had refrained noting that the man presented no risk to Canadian forces. Arush fell to the ground, hit by one of the two men’s shots. He struggled to stand up, but both men fired again, killing him.^[20]

It was noted that Sabrie had been carrying a ceremonial dagger in his clothing.^[20][24] When the unit was ordered to bring the dead body of Arush be brought over to the same position as Sabrie, the soldiers radioed back that they couldn’t move the body without it falling apart.^[20] So the body of Arush was loaded into a body bag and placed inside a Bison personnel carrier.^[6] There, medical technician MCpl Petersen re-opened the bag and took Polaroid photographs for an unknown reason, some suggest to document the shooting, others suggest as a «trophy».^[6] The photos showed gaping wounds in Arush’s neck and the side of his face, with his skull twisted out of shape by the force of the gunblast. His intestines protruded from his stomach, and his right eye is missing.^[6]

An Air Force flight surgeon, Major Barry Armstrong, examined the body and judged the death «suspicious», suggesting that Arush had been lying prone on the ground when he was killed.^[6] He also noted that the amount of omentum which had passed through the first wounds suggested the 29-year-old Arush had been breathing for at least 2 or 3 minutes before the final gunshots to his head were fired.^[24]

After the examination, Arush’s body was then used for medical practice for soldiers, demonstrating how to stab a tracheotomy into a wounded man’s throat to allow him to breathe, and then used to demonstrate the proper preparation of a body for transportation. The body was then returned to the body bag, and sent into the local hospital, where Dr. Xelen released it to Arush’s family the same evening.^[6][20] For the next two weeks, Colonel Allan Wells approached Vice-Admiral Larry Murray asking to send military police to Somalia to investigate the shooting, but was rebuffed.^[6] When the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral John Rogers Anderson, visited the military base on March 8–9, he visited the wounded Somali recovering in the Canadian hospital.^[6]

The event would not have been reported, except that Member of Parliament John Brewin read out an anonymous letter he had received from a soldier about witnessing the «execution» of a Somali civilian on March 4.^[1]

At the subsequent inquiry, Klick defended Rainville, heavily criticising his commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu, and testified that American Special Forces Chief Warrant Officer Jackson had interrogated the wounded Somali who confessed to being a saboteur; although this contradicted all other evidence, including the statements of the American soldier who never mentioned any interrogation.^[6][20] In 1994, the Ministry of Defence engaged in an undercover attempt to discredit Armstrong’s findings, phoning Allan Thompson of the Toronto Star and offering to leak to him the pathology report by James Ferris conducted two months after the killing, which found the decomposing body showed none of the signs Armstrong had suggested. Thompson took his evidence of a preconceived «leak» from the Ministry to the subsequent inquiry, where they added weight to Armstrong’s findings.^[6] While his commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu described Armstrong as bordering on insanity at the inquiry, the only evidence he produced was that he liked to climb onto the roof of the hospital at night in Somalia and watch the stars.^[6]

Death of Shidane Arone

On March 16, 1993, Captain Michael Sox found Shidane Abukar Arone hiding in a portable toilet in an abandoned American base across from the Canadian base and, believing he was attempting to sneak into the Canadian base to steal supplies, turned him over to another soldier, who led the teenager to a bunker being used to house munitions.^[9][25] Arone protested, claiming he had simply been trying to find a lost child.^[9][14]

At 21:00, Sgt. Mark Boland replaced Master Corporal Clayton Matchee as guard of the prisoner, and ordered that his foot bindings be removed, and replaced with fetters as the ropes were too tight.^[14] Warrant Officer Murphy took the opportunity to kick Arone «savagely», which was later claimed to be implicit permission to abuse the prisoner.^[14] At this time, Matchee began his abuse of Arone by removing the captive’s clothing and using it to crudely waterboard the youth until Boland objected, and Matchee left the bunker.^[14]

At 22:00, Trooper Kyle Brown took over guard duty, and brought Matchee back with him. Brown punched Arone in the jaw, and was told by Boland, rather prophetically, «I don’t care what you do, just don’t kill the guy», to which Brown replied that he wanted to «kill this fucker».^[14] Boland then joined Matchee and Matt McKay for beers in the mess hall, where Matchee spoke about what he wanted to do to Arone, and suggested he might put out cigarette butts on his feet. McKay suggested that Matchee might use a ration pack or phone book to beat the youth, as it would not leave any traces.^[14]

Matchee and Brown, both members of 2 Commando, then proceeded to beat Arone.^[25] Matchee used a ration pack to beat the youth, as well as a broomstick, and sodomised the teenager with it.^[14][26] Brown participated in the abuse, but was primarily an observer and took sixteen «trophy photos» of the beating, including one of Matchee forcing Arone’s mouth open with a baton, and one of himself holding Pte. David Brocklebank’s loaded pistol to Arone’s head.^{[14][27][28][29]} At approximately 23:20, Master Cpl. Giasson entered the bunker, Matchee showed him Arone, who was now semi-conscious and bleeding, and boasted that «in Canada we cannot do that, and here they let us do it».^[14]

Estimates have ranged from 15-80 other soldiers could hear or observe the beating, but did not intervene.^[14][25] Corporal MacDonald, acting as duty signaller that night, was asked by Sgt. Major Mills about «a long dragged out howl» heard from the vicinity of the bunker, but MacDonald refused to stop playing Game Boy to investigate. Later, Matchee came by to borrow a cigarette from MacDonald and mentioned that «now the Black man would fear the Indian as he did the white man», and MacDonald went outside to check on Arone’s status. He saw Matchee hitting him in the face with the baton, and reported that the prisoner was «getting a good shit-kicking» to Sgt. Perry Gresty, before retiring to bed for the night.^[14]

Arone fell unconscious after several hours of beatings, after shouting «Canada! Canada! Canada!» as his last words.^[25] When Brown mentioned the event to Sergeant J.K. Hillier, the non-commissioned officer noted there «would be trouble» if the prisoner died, and went to check on the youth whom he found had no pulse, and base medics confirmed that the boy was dead.^[14] It was later discovered that Arone had burn marks on his penis.^[26]

Response

Jim Day, a reporter with the Pembroke Observer local newspaper from the regiment’s hometown, was on the base at the time and was the first to report that Canadian soldiers were being held pending an investigation into the death of a Somali citizen.^[1]

The debate over what led to the events came at a politically sensitive time in Canada, as the Minister of National Defence Kim Campbell was in the midst of a Progressive Conservative Party of Canada leadership campaign to become Prime Minister.^[11] Matters were made worse when Campbell tried to dismiss the allegations of racism in the Canadian military by referring to it as «youthful folly» and suggesting that it was commonplace.^[11] Criticism also focused on the fact that it took five weeks to order a high-level investigation into the events in Somalia.

Some, including Member of Parliament John Cummins, quickly pointed out that three of the four men facing the most serious charges had been given experimental injections of Lariam, a brand-name of Mefloquine, to test its effects on combatting malaria in a controlled study group. The drug was known to cause paranoia, lack of judgment, neurosis and other mental side effects, and some have suggested it bore some responsibility for the soldiers’ actions.^[17] Dr. Michele Brill-Edwards had actually resigned in protest from Health Canada over her belief that the drug could produce «dangerous psychiatric reactions» in the soldiers.^[17]

Legal proceedings

A death in custody automatically triggered an investigation, and two days later Matchee and Brown were arrested and charged with the murder and National Defence Headquarters was advised.

Matchee later attempted to hang himself in his cell; the attempt failed but caused massive brain damage, making him unfit to stand trial.

McAuliffe’s request for documents

In September 1995, CBC reporter Michael McAuliffe requested access to 68 Response to Query forms to supplement his earlier informal gleanings about the Canadian military operation, but the documents were altered before being released to him, in order to make them agree with the information he’d been given earlier.^[6] In addition, invented financial charges were tagged onto his request, claiming that it had taken 413 man-hours and subsequently would cost McAuliffe $4,080, although the documents were in fact readily available.^[32][33][34]

While giving McAuliffe misinformation informally was not illegal, it was a crime for the government to release forged documents in response to an Access to Information request.^[6] The question quickly emerged of whether Chief of Defence Staff Jean Boyle had known about the altering, and if he bore responsibility for it even if he were ignorant of his underlings’ doings.^[6] On September 5, 1995, a clerk at the NDHQ was discovered collecting Somalia-related documents for a burn bag to be destroyed.^[6] Boyle later concurred that there had been documents proving attempts to cover up details of both the May 4 and May 16 killings.^[10][35]

Somalia Inquiry

The public outcry against Arone’s death didn’t occur until November 1994, when a publication ban was lifted against the 16 photographs Brown had taken of the torture session and they were widely published in Canadian media.^[11]

The new government of Jean Chrétien‘s Liberal Party initiated a highly visible Somalia Inquiry in 1994 under Federal Court Judge Gilles Létourneau. Officially known as the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, its hearings were broadcast daily in both languages, nationally.

As the inquiry unfolded, home videos of initiation rites in the CAR’s French-speaking commando found their way into the media. The new Minister of National Defence David Collenette argued that the videos were disgusting, demeaning and racist. With the continued accumulation of such politically damaging visibility, the Minister of National Defence advised Governor General Roméo LeBlanc to disband the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 1995. It has been suggested^{[by whom?]} that this move was as much driven by budget cuts to the Canadian Forces as by the Somalia Affair, but there is no question that the affair gave the minister the public support needed to make his request for disbandment.

The Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain, who had not supported the minister’s disbandment order of the Airborne, resigned under a cloud. His successor, Air Force General Jean Boyle was forced to resign only a few months after accepting the role when, in a gesture uncharacteristic of military tradition, he blamed his subordinates for previous wrongdoing under his command. Minister of National Defence David Collenette was also forced to resign, partially due to the affair.

On April 8, 1996, Boyle called a halt to all normal duties and announced the entire Canadian military would begin searching for documents relating to Somalia.^[6]

The inquiry ran until 1997 when it was cut short by the government in the months before the 1997 election. The government was critical of the direction of the inquiry, noting that it was far exceeding its mandate.^[23] Member of Parliament Art Eggleton — who went on to become Minister of National Defence after the 1997 election — suggested that the events had happened four years earlier, and it was time to «move on».^[23]

Indeed, the conduct of the new government after the Somalia affair and the search for documents now absorbed much of the inquiry’s attention, as reflected in its report. The inquiry had run long over its allotted timeframe and budget. The decision to end the inquiry received visible media attention and may have contributed to the defeat of the new Defence Minister Doug Young in the 1997 election. The inquiry was never able to examine top level governmental decision-making, nor did it actually examine the alleged events in Somalia.

The final report of the inquiry was a striking attack on the procedures, support and leadership of the Canadian Forces and the Ministry of Defence. Many of the top officers in the Canadian Forces were excoriated, including three separate Chiefs of the Defence Staff. The CAR had been rushed into a war zone with inadequate preparation or legal support. Enquiry observer retired Brigadier-General Dan Loomis noted that the operation had changed, in December 1992, «from a peacekeeping operation, where arms are used only in self-defence, to one where arms could be used proactively to achieve politico-military objectives…In short the Canadian Forces were being put on active service and sent to war (as defined by Chapter 7 of the UN Charter).» Its deployment into «war» had never been debated in parliament and indeed the Canadian public had been led to believe by its government that the CAR was on a «peacekeeping» mission. After the events the leaders of the Canadian Forces had been far more concerned with self-preservation than in trying to find the truth. The inquiry report singled out Major-General Lewis MacKenzie as a major exception, as he took full responsibility for any errors he made.

Aftermath of the Affair

The affair had a number of long lasting effects. While it is difficult to separate the effects of the affair on Canadian Forces morale from those of the concurrent defence spending cut, it did exacerbate feelings of distrust towards the media and politicians among many CF members.

At the same time, public trust in the Canadian Forces suffered and recruitment became more difficult. Public revulsion provided support for the sharp cuts to military spending introduced by the Liberal government. Many of the report’s comments, along with the sustained media criticism of the military, led to the hasty imposition of policies designed to ensure nothing similar to the Somalia Affair could happen again. It has been argued^{[by whom?]} that many of these practices, such as the micro-management of training, operations and disciplinary processes from NDHQ and the resultant restrictions on commanding officers, hamper the flexibility of operational units. Since the events in Somalia, Canada has become far less ready to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping efforts.^{[citation needed]} Once playing an important role in the majority of UN efforts, in subsequent years Canada simply provided indirect support. Post 2001 though, spending on the Canadian Forces gradually increased and accelerated as Canada played a major role in Afghanistan. Concurrently public perception of the Canadian Forces improved dramatically as well.

In 1999, judge J. Douglas Cunningham dismissed an appeal for financial compensation by Arone’s parents Abubakar Arone Rage and Dahabo Omar Samow, ruling that their use of a litigation guardian, Abdullahi Godah Barre, was inconsistent with the legal requirement, and they should have traveled to Canada to launch the suit themselves.^[5][36]

Brown later co-operated on a book in which it was suggested he had been made the scapegoat for the incident and the officers who had not intervened were not brought to justice.^[26]

Soldiers of other countries also faced charges of misconduct; American soldiers were involved in the deaths of three young boys in separate incidents,^[37] Pakistani troops were accused of a number of civilian deaths,^[37] and Belgian soldiers took photographs of themselves allegedly torturing a Somali to death.^[37]

Other long term effects on the Forces included the adoption of sensitivity training, including SHARP (Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention) training, which became mandatory for every single member of the Forces, and was accompanied by a declaration of «zero tolerance» on racism and harassment of any kind, including hazing.

Some have suggested that Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Commissioner Joseph Philip Robert Murray was slated to be replaced, until Boyle was removed — making it difficult for the Prime Minister to simultaneously replace the head of the armed forces and the head of the federal police.^[38]

Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention in the wake of The Somalia Affair

The notion of peacekeeping seems to be deeply embedded in Canadian culture and a distinguishing feature that Canadians feel sets their foreign policy apart from the likes of the United States. The Somalia commission wrote in 1997 that “Canada’s foreign policy with respect to peacekeeping has been consistent since Canadians embraced peacekeeping in the late 1950s”.^[39] Since the Suez Crisis, Canadian foreign policy has fit a peacekeeping rubric. Americans however were seen to fight wars, but Canadians pictured themselves as working for peace.^[39] Canada never had a reputation for starting wars but instead was seen to come to the aid of war torn countries.

The Somalia Affair came as such as surprise to the Canadian public as no one would have thought Canada’s golden reputation for international peacekeeping could be tarnished. The Somalia Affair and the ensuing commission of inquiry has become the subject of intense criticism and has given rise to a great deal of comparative theoretical work on humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. In her book Sherene Razack asks if it was just a case of ‘a few bad apples’ in the Canadian forces, or if the Somalia Affair speaks to a larger issue on the complex nature of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention.^[40] Thomas Weiss comments that the failures in Somalia have led to this concept of ‘Somalia Syndrome’: “multilateral interventions to thwart starvation, genocide, the forced movement of peoples, and massive violations of fundamental rights are no longer politically or operationally feasible”.^[41] Peacekeepers are more likely to be involved in peace enforcement in more warlike conditions as unlike traditional peacekeeping; there is not always consent from all the conflicting parties.^[40] Such was the case in Somalia as the men were hypervigilent with a sense of fear and frustration as they were trained for combat yet charged with providing humanitarian aid.^[40] Faced with this strong Somali opposition and resentment and yet being responsible for providing aid meant that Canadian peacekeepers “increasingly could not find meaning in their activities” ^[40] There would be a ‘Somalia syndrome’ sentiment that would linger in the international community after the failures in the war torn country. Weiss however reminds us not to take Somalia out of context or draw upon the wrong lessons leading to isolationism or eschewing necessary humanitarian intervention. The debacle in Somalia would be so paralyzing that it would lead to an unwillingness from the international community to respond to future problems, like the Rwandan Genocide. The United States under the Clinton Administration would need to rethink its foreign policies and the rest of the world just did not want another Somalia Affair ^[41]

The Somalia Affair thus had a direct impact on how the international community would make foreign policy with a crippling ‘Somalia syndrome’ that would lead to the sense of caution in intervening in the Rwanda Genocide and in the Balkans.

See also

• Bystander effect
• Command responsibility
• List of Canadian military operations
• List of Canadian Peacekeeping Missions

References

Further reading

• Grant Dawson (2007). «Here is hell»: Canada’s engagement in Somalia. UBC Press. ISBN 978-0-7748-1297-9. http://books.google.com/books?id=eHe9h45lyQoC&pg=PP1.
• Sherene Razack (2004). Dark threats and white knights: the Somalia Affair, peacekeeping, and the new imperialism. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-0-8020-8663-1. http://books.google.com/books?id=Kc6K0T58yMsC&pg=PP1.
• Mock, Karen R. U.S. Department of Education, The Somalia Inquiry: What Does It Have to Do with Us?, 1996

External links

• Canadian Broadcast Standards Council, Canada AM: Airborne Hazing, complaint brought by a viewer to CTV’s decision to broadcast hazing footage she deemed «too explicit».
• CBC Archives — The Somalia Affair
• Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia

Самым худшим результатом развития ситуации в Ливии может стать «сомалийский сценарий». Такое мнение высказал в понедельник вице-премьер РФ Сергей Иванов, выступая в Нью-Йорке в Совете по международным отношениям.

 По его мнению, передает ИТАР-ТАСС, ООН приняла резолюцию 1973 /после которой последовала операция сил коалиции/, «очень поспешно и быстро». «Это произошло, конечно, по понятным причинам — Каддафи убивал своих сограждан, но текст резолюции не очень ясно и понятно определяет ту точку, после которой применение военных сил может и должно быть использовано, а где их применение запрещается»,- сказал С.Иванов.

 «Точка зрения многих россиян состоит в том, что вопрос о защите гражданского населения не подвергается сомнению, он священен, — сказал вице-премьер. — Но когда мы видим по телевидению, что представители так называемой оппозиции ведут бои и при этом несут в руках «базуки», автоматы Калашникова, другую тяжелую военную технику, тогда у нас возникает вопрос — это и есть гражданские лица?»

 «Кроме того, огромный вопрос заключается в том, что собой представляет ливийская оппозиция. Никто этого не знает и не понимает». «И самым худшим результатом развития ситуации в Ливии может стать «сомалийский сценарий», и это — возможно», — добавил С.Иванов.